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Abstract  
This paper derives from our joint interest in understanding how scientific mobility 
affects developing countries. Many authors have addressed the topic previously, both 
from an economic and from a sociological perspective. However, recent literature 
evinces dissatisfaction with both analytical frameworks and the framing of public 
policies addressing the brain drain problematic. This paper is a contribution to 
understanding the historical and theoretical foundations of the “brain drain” debate. 
We aim to improve conceptual clarity regarding the itinerancy of human beings and 
the mobilization of human capital. We develop a critical review of the economics of 
the brain drain, highlighting the work of some key early thinkers and pointing out the 
way in which subsequent work has taken up selected aspects of their approaches 
leaving other challenges aside. We then consider the diaspora networks literature, 
which is characterized as taking a “connectionist” approach to the brain drain. We 
identify two fundamental problems: the sidelining of complementarity and context 
dependency as basic properties of human capital; and a failure to adequately 
disentangle the concepts of human resources for science and technology (HRST) and 
human capital in academic and policy discourse about the brain drain.  
Introduction 
Scientific discovery and knowledge diffusion have been associated with the itinerancy of 
scientists and scholars since the beginning of written history. In the modern era, flows of 
scientists and intellectuals increased after the Second World War, during the subsequent 
Cold War and the last decades of the twentieth century, linked to the social, economic 
and political disparities between countries and the development of systems of mass 
long-distance transportation (US House of Representatives, 1977). A prominent framing 
of contemporary global intellectual itinerancy is that which has been labelled the “brain 
drain”.  
 
An early use of the term “brain drain” was in reference to the exodus of British scientists 
to the United States (USA) in the 1960s (US House of Representatives, Committee on 
International Relations, 1977), apparently denoting a permanent knowledge and welfare 
loss suffered by the sending country in such circumstances. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
bases of human capital theory in economics were being laid down around the same time, 
with Theodore Schultz publishing his first reflections on the role of education and human 
capital formation in economic development (1961, 1963) and Gary Becker his theory of 
human capital (1964). While economists were designing a theory addressing the crucial 
role that the accumulation of embodied knowledge plays in economic development, 
politicians and policymakers were becoming increasingly concerned about potential 
deleterious consequences associated with the emigration of the highly skilled. This 
concern continues today. Voices from Africa and Latin America describe the damaging 
effects that the brain drain has on their societies.1
 
This discourse also remains prominent 
in Eastern and Southern European countries, such as Poland (Ackers, 2009) and Italy 
(Morano-Foadi, 2006). Brain drain has also been identified as a significant issue, and 
ameliorated via innovative policy strategies, in both North-East and South-East Asia 
(Krishna and Khadria, 1997; Song, 1997; Zweig, 2007). However, despite sustained 
attention on the issue, discontent remains regarding both analytical frameworks and 
public policy (Gaillard and Gaillard, 2003; Skeldon, 2009). 
 
In this paper, we argue that the persistence of the brain drain problematic, whilst 
obviously largely due to uneven socio-economic and scientific development, is also 
partly due to the failure to resolve certain theoretical issues that frame policy thinking. 
As we see it, the most fundamental problem is the conceptual conflation of the 
demographic category of skilled human resources for science and technology (HRST) 
and the economic concept of human capital (HC). Despite being obviously closely 
related and intertwined empirically, they belong to distinct ontological registers. 
However, most work on the brain drain tends to conflate the two, leading to a situation in 
which human capital is conceived as bounded and enclosed by an individual body. Of 
course, this conceptual conflation is not unique to studies of the brain drain. However, we 
consider it particularly troublesome in relation to the brain drain problematic due to its 
methodological “convenience”, which over time has framed analysis in particular ways.  
 
To illustrate our claims, in this paper we take a genealogical approach to the foundations 
of the economics of the brain drain debate. We will show that in the early debate 
regarding the brain drain in the 1960s, human capital was not treated as an easily 
divisible and “countable” category. We point out how subsequent work has taken up 
selected aspects that can be more easily assimilated to general equilibrium economic 
assumptions and calculative techniques.  
 
We then consider literature in which attempts have been made to develop an alternative 
approach to the brain drain problematic in the space left by the methodological enclosing 
of economic analyses. According to Favell et al. (2007: 19), the orthodox brain drain 
debate has largely failed to account for “the frequent back and forth movement of 
migrants, ideas, knowledge, information, and skill sets that is now a routine part of 
contemporary transnationalism”. Alternative approaches have emerged that consider 
these processes on the receiving side; for example, from perspectives of knowledge 
transactions (Williams, 2007) or innovation systems (Hart, 2007). However, work 
addressing the key brain drain problematic – the nature, value, scale and scope of 
benefits to countries of emigration – has largely stagnated since Meyer and colleagues 
developed their “diaspora knowledge network” approach more than a decade and a half 
ago. We take another look at this “connectionist” approach, arguing that in its theoretical 
critique of the neoclassical economics of the brain drain, it has much in common with the 
“lost fundamentals” of the early economics debate. However, we also suggest that their 
empirically derived descriptions of transnational spaces of circulation, organized around 
cultural/national identification, are not then translated into a conceptual approach to 
distributed human capital. This leads to the final section of the paper, in which we 
pro-pose a broad agenda for reinvigorated scholarship directed at the problematic of the 
brain drain.  
The economics of the brain drain: The 1960s debate  
The first academic debate concerning the brain drain opposed two views of the 
consequences of scientific migration phenomenon: the so-called “nationalist” and 
“internationalist” models. Harry Johnson provided the touchstone for the internationalist 
model. He was one of the first authors to discuss “the economics of the brain drain”, 
pointing out that the term “drain” conveyed a strong implication of serious loss (Johnson, 
1965). The questions to be addressed were therefore “to whom does the loss occur and 
what sort of loss is it?” Clearly the loss does not affect “the brains that are being drained” 
(Johnson, 1965: 299). In fact, Schultz (1961) had earlier considered migration as a form 
of an individual’s investment in human capital. The loss derived from migration would 
thus affect those who continued to reside in the country of origin.  
 
Johnson (1965: 300) connected concern about outward migration with “the philosophy of 
economic nationalism” and proposed an alternative “internationalist model” (Johnson, 
1968), which considered the potential benefits of the outflow of the highly skilled, both 
for the home country and the world economy. He criticized policymakers’ automatic 
association of outflows with “drains”, concluding that the variety of potential gains and 
losses to the world economy as a whole, and to sending and receiving economies, did not 
allow for such simplistic interpretations. In contrast, authors such as Boulding (1968) and 
Patinkin (1968) argued the importance of human capital for national economies and the 
potential dangers of emigration from developing countries. 
 
The debate was set, overall, within a broad conceptual framework reflecting the 
complexity of the phenomenon under study. Johnson found more reasons to be optimistic 
about the final welfare creation and distribution effects of the brain drain, whereas 
Boulding (1968), Kidd (1965) and Patinkin (1968) placed more emphasis on the potential 
negative consequences for developing economies. The main arguments sustaining the 
views of these authors are summarized in Table 1.  
 
A certain conception of human capital can be argued to underlie the statements in Table 
1. This conception contains several key elements structuring the analytical reflections of 
these authors:  
• individuals are heterogeneous, interconnected, interdependent, face uncertainty, 
and are embedded in temporality;  
• the productivity and value of human capital varies depending on the social and 
economic context of its use; and  
• factors of production are complementary.  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that such assumptions can be found in the 1960s brain drain 
debate, given the close involvement of Kenneth Boulding, considered to be one of the 
fathers of evolutionary economics (Boulding, 1981). These fundamental assumptions 
have much in common with thinking in contemporary evolutionary economics.2
 
As such, 
they differ markedly from those of the neoclassical equilibrium approach that was to 
become increasingly dominant from the 1960s.  
 
Boulding developed a comprehensive body of economic theory, which moved away from 
Newtonian mechanics analogies and therefore from the general equilibrium paradigm 
that forms the base for what is commonly known as “standard” or “mainstream” 
economics. Instead, Boulding’s economic theory was explicitly inspired by the biological 
sciences (Boulding, 1981: 25).  
 
When addressing the brain drain phenomenon, Boulding (1968) starts by insisting on the 
greater importance of human compared to physical capital for economic development: 
“Physical capital is merely human knowledge imposed on the physical world” but “it is 
not the existing stock of knowledge in a society which determines its rate of development 
as much as its capacity for learning” (Boulding, 1968: 112–113). For Boulding,  
… human capital even more than physical capital is a structure, rather than an 
aggregate. We do not necessarily increase the productive capacity of a society by 
adding another person to it, even if he is very expensively trained, if that person does 
not fit into the matrix of information flows in a way that increases the productivity of 
the society. (1968: 113)  
The problem of economic development is for Boulding (1966, 1973, 1991 [1956]) – as 
for Hayek (1945) – mainly one of organization of knowledge in society. His conception 
of the world as system brings him to stress the connections between the different factors 
contributing to production processes, of which know-how and learning are of major 
importance. His focus on the dynamic and interactive dimension of the system contrasts 
with the mechanical models involving constant parameters relied on by mainstream 
economics (Boulding, 1981). Consider the argument supported by Kidd (1965) and 
Patinkin (1968) – N.5 in Table 1 – that the movement of a few scientists and engineers 
can cripple and destroy a field or a department in less developed countries (see Table 1). 
As Boulding implies, a few scientists may play crucial roles in social structures (as 
educators or leaders) that might be broken into disparate parts if they migrate. In this 
context, actors are connected and complement each other. It is therefore not the number 
of emigrants that is crucial, but where they are integrated into the human capital 
structure.  
 
We might also recall Johnson’s (1968: 74) statement I.4 (Table 1). Johnson argues that 
the migrant might fit better into a production structure in a country of migration than in 
the country of origin. It is wrong to assume that their role was crucial in the home 
country. Rather, it is how the location of individuals configures, or reconfigures, 
particular human capital structures that is decisive. Migrants may return, or establish 
connections from abroad; in either case, the associated reconfiguration of human capital 
structures could potentially entail socio-economic benefit.  
 
Table 1: Two visions of the brain drain: the 1960s debate in economics 
 
 
According to this analytical framework, heterogeneous contexts (different roles, 
connections and the fit to the productive structures) and complementarity (between 
production factors and social and economic structures) are key elements for 
understanding the varied consequences of geographical flows of highly skilled scientists 
and engineers. Human capital is understood as entering a specific production structure in 
which it needs to fit. This implies, for example, that an economy cannot be defined or 
evaluated in terms of the number of biologists it contains. To assess the value derived 
from having biologists, there is a need to study what, if any, role they play in social and 
productive structures. 
 
As this overview suggests, aspects of the 1960s brain drain debate were conceptually 
sophisticated and considered human capital to be distributed, characterizing this in terms 
of the connectivity and complementarity between individuals in forming productive 
structures. However, despite the broadness of this initial debate, the subsequent 
economic models that assessed the role of the brain drain in economic development 
followed a conceptually and methodologically “standard” tradition, relying on 
neoclassical equilibrium premises. In the following section, we describe the major 
assumptions and contributions of this neoclassical economics of the brain drain.  
The neoclassical economics of the brain drain 
In contrast to the diversity of the economic debate on the brain drain of the 1960s, our 
review found that subsequent approaches to the brain drain have been predominantly 
built on the assumptions of general equilibrium economics and standard human capital 
theory. General equilibrium models rely on the concept of homogeneous representative 
agents. An individual with a certain accumulation of human capital, defined in terms of 
years of schooling or experience, is representative of any other individual with the same 
level. Individuals are autonomous and respond to market signals when making decisions 
about investments in education and their professional choices, including migration.  
The basic neoclassical model for homogeneous labour  
The conceptual starting point is a market that operates in perfect competition and in 
which workers earn an income that is equal to their marginal product. Differences in 
skills or human capital endowments of workers are not yet considered: any worker is a 
perfect substitute for any other in the economy. All agents have perfect information 
about market prices and automatically respond to changes. Labour markets adjust to the 
equilibrium levels of supply and demand assuring full employment. A person leaving the 
productive system would not harm the national economy, as she would only take away 
the value of her marginal product, which she herself earns anyway.3 The departure of a 
person could even raise the nation’s capital/labour ratio (Grubel and Scott, 1966). The 
assumption of diminishing returns to scale in the use of labour implies that emigration 
will raise per capita income if the endowments of all other factors of production remain 
constant (Bhagwati and Rodriguez, 1975).  
The basic brain drain framework (with heterogeneous labour)  
To assess the effect of the emigration of the highly skilled, the above assumptions are 
changed. Workers are considered to be endowed with different levels of human capital, 
which implies the recognition of certain market inefficiencies. This is due to the 
particular characteristics of human capital compared to other production factors. 
According to Becker (1993 [1964]: 312), “knowledge is not subject to diminishing 
returns in the same way as is physical capital because greater knowledge raises the 
productivity of further investment in knowledge”. The increasing returns of human 
capital imply that the rate of return on human capital grows as the stock of human capital 
increases.  
 
Economies of scale are therefore associated with the accumulation of human capital in 
the economy. External economies also appear, as highly skilled persons have the 
capacity not only to increase their own productivity, but also to encourage the 
productivity of other agents.4 The social product of skilled persons is therefore higher 
than their marginal product. The inefficiency relies on the fact that the market that 
rewards skilled individuals with an income equivalent to their marginal product fails to 
compensate them for their contribution to society. The market thus fails to provide an 
optimum level of investment in human capital because social benefits of this investment 
are higher than private ones. This failure is normally addressed through governmental 
investment in education.
 
 
Some implications of the above premises are as follows: (i) skilled individuals will be 
attracted to locations with high stocks of human capital and therefore higher returns to 
their accumulated skills;5
 
(ii) skilled emigrants take not only their marginal product with 
them but also their social product; and (iii) if skilled emigrants’ education was financed 
by the government, then emigrants fail to repay this investment through their 
contribution to the tax system.  
 
It follows that low-income countries will suffer the consequences of net welfare losses 
associated with the departure of skilled individuals. The net losses will be especially high 
if the government funds education, as is normally the case.  
 
Returning to the questions posed by Johnson (1965) (to whom does the loss occur and 
what sort of loss is it?), we may summarize the implications of the above basic 
framework by pointing out that the particular economic properties of human capital, and 
the fact that the market fails to allocate it efficiently, imply that emigration of skilled 
individuals has a negative effect on the home economies, as they lose their investments 
in education and the productive potential of the emigrated capital. This would justify 
why an outflow tends to be automatically considered as “a drain”. From the 1970s, the 
economic debate on the brain drain revolved around discussion of this basic framework 
and its effects. Below, we review the principal arguments that have contributed to this 
debate. First, we focus on the discussion of losses (drains) and, second, we review the 
discussion on the potential gains that have also been linked to skilled emigration.  
Discussing the basic brain drain framework  
Grubel and Scott (1966) start from the basic model, but argue that losses associated with 
skilled emigration are normally only temporary. In the long run, economies will adapt to 
frictional inefficiencies associated with skilled migration. Other skilled workers will 
replace emigrants (Grubel and Scott, 1966: 271). In relation to the loss of public 
investment in education, these authors argue that emigrants take along their contribution 
to tax revenue, but also their children, on whom this share of revenue would have been 
spent. According to Grubel and Scott, the losses that a country suffers due to skilled 
emigration are not as great as the basic brain drain model would suggest.6 
 
Bhagwati and colleagues challenged this optimistic outlook, which supported Johnson’s 
“internationalist view”. Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) acknowledged the possible losses 
of skilled emigration described, focusing on additional factors that may cause welfare 
losses in sending/developing countries. In Bhagwati and Dellalfar (1973), Bhagwati and 
Hamada (1974), Bhagwati and Rodríguez (1975) and Bhagwati (1979), the assumption 
of perfectly competitive labour markets is removed. Wages respond to market forces, but 
also to other factors. According to these models, in developing countries the salary levels 
of the educated elites tend to imitate the wages of comparable groups in more developed 
countries, reaching a level above the equilibrium market price and encouraging 
unemployment among the educated. The high salary levels encourage the demand for 
education, which in turn may accentuate skilled unemployment if wages do not react to 
the higher supply of skills in the economy and remain high. Additionally, the wages of 
the unskilled tend to be pulled up by the highest wages, also encouraging unskilled 
unemployment. In these models, migration of skilled manpower leads to a distortion of 
salary levels, encouraging general unemployment and an overexpansion of educational 
facilities (Bhagwati and Dellalfar, 1973). Additionally, the possibility of migration 
inhibits the internal diffusion of skills. Bhagwati (1979: 20) illustrates this phenomenon 
(“brain waste”) with the example of a Filipino doctor working as a cab driver in Manila 
while he awaits the opportunity to pass an examination to migrate to the USA, instead of 
starting medical practice in his own country.  
 
In summary, these authors conclude that skilled emigration from developing countries 
entails important losses for the sending economies that go far beyond the consequences 
of frictional temporary adjustments. This results in higher levels of public expenditures 
and lower welfare. More recent models have supported these conclusions. Wong and Yip 
(1999) build a model in which growth is endogenously determined by human capital 
accumulation and reduced by the human capital loss that follows migration. Pieretti and 
Zou (2009) challenge Grubel and Scott (1966) by focusing on the effects on per-capita 
income of different grades of substitutability between skilled and unskilled labour. 
Another possible negative effect follows from changes in the composition of human 
capital in sending countries. Different paths of development require different types of 
skills. Migration prospects may distort the agents’ incentives to accumulate the most 
appropriate skills for their country of origin, which reduces growth rates (Di Maria and 
Stryszowski, 2009). However, “modern brain drain theory” (Glytsos, 2009) challenges 
these conclusions by adding new dimensions to the analysis, arguing that they turn the 
“brain drain” into a beneficial phenomenon, an argument to which we now turn. 
 
The beneficial brain drain, or brain gain  
Alternative models to those described in the previous section argue that the overall 
impact of the brain drain is eventually beneficial due to internal dynamics. The important 
argument here is that the prospect of migration raises the expected potential returns on 
education and encourages workers to invest more in human capital (Stark et al., 1998). 
This raises the average level of human capital and the productivity levels of the economy 
(Stark, 2004).  
 
The positive effects of the prospect of migration on human capital accumulation and 
productivity of the sending countries have been also addressed by Beine et al. (2001, 
2008), Easterly and Nyarko, (2008), Kapur and McHale (2005), Mountford (1997) and 
Solimanos (2008). Beine et al. (2008) conduct an empirical analysis of 127 developing 
countries, estimating brain drain and gain effects. They conclude that, from a global 
perspective, the benefits to major gaining countries such as China, India and Brazil 
outweigh the losers’ losses. These recent studies refer to this phenomenon as beneficial 
brain drain or brain gain. Methodologically, these studies retain the assumptions of the 
prior neoclassical models and general equilibrium theory and, as pointed out above, they 
consider the changes in expected returns on education that the possibility of migration 
entails. The elements that these studies have added to the 1960s discussion are 
summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Brain drain and development: the ‘mainstream’ debate  
 
 
Assessing the economics of the brain drain: Lost fundamentals and aggregative 
public policies 
There are fundamental reasons why Tables 1 and 2 should not be merged. As pointed out 
earlier, the 1960s discussion summarized in Table 1 was not enclosed by general 
equilibrium assumptions and, instead, assumed interconnection and complementarity 
among agents and production factors. In contrast, the general equilibrium–based brain 
drain models provide formal descriptions of human capital accumulation (or 
un-accumulation) dynamics, in a context in which connectivity and complementarity are 
not integrated. Economic growth and welfare automatically benefit from the aggregation 
of human capital units, which are accumulated through the training of new people within 
the national education system and their incorporation to the labour force or through 
immigration. In turn, human capital is mainly lost through emigration, retirement or 
mortality of skilled personnel 
 
The neoclassical brain drain models discussed reach different conclusions depending on 
which elements of these aggregative dynamics are emphasized. For example, in 
Bhagwati (1979), the emigration prospect discourages highly skilled persons from 
looking for a job in their home country, leading to brain drain and un/under-employment 
– a net human capital loss. Alternatively, in Beine et al. (2001, 2008), the emigration 
prospect encourages more persons to get tertiary level education: some of those people 
will then remain in the national labour force – a potential net gain in human capital.  
 
From a policy perspective, the implications of such analyses are quite straightforward. 
An economy or a scientific system should maximize the number of highly qualified and 
skilled individuals as a proxy for the accumulation of human capital. The precise policy 
strategies adopted to achieve maximization would depend on the particular aggregative 
model considered. For example, where emigration prospects are assumed to encourage 
human capital formation, the ideal level of emigration might not be nil.  
 
In Europe, a compatible policy approach has indeed emerged, promoting three main 
actions to achieve the accumulation objective: to train, to retain and to attract human 
capital (including attracting emigrants to return). The document that sets the bases for the 
formation of the European Research Area (CEC, 2000) clearly states that Europe suffers 
a brain drain (mainly to the USA) and sets the objectives of “attracting the best 
researchers from all over the world … and encouraging the return to European 
laboratories of researchers who have left” (CEC, 2000: 19). The “train, retain, attract” 
policy strategy has recently been restated by the European Commission (CEC, 2007: 10), 
but it has been enriched by other approaches to which we will later refer.  
 
Numerous examples may also be found of policies in developing countries where “train” 
and “attract back” rationales predominate. In China, overseas PhD support funded by the 
Chinese Scholarship Committee normally requires the recipient to return to China to 
work for 2 years following completion of their doctorate abroad. Such conditionality of 
international research training grants has been a common practice in Latin American 
countries – in Peru, for example, where the brain outflow increases while publicly funded 
opportunities to train abroad remain vacant due to the lack of opportunities to find a job 
in the country after compulsory return (Portillo, 2010). The limited success of this type 
of programme has been acknowledged (Villanueva, 2009). Claims have emerged for 
multifaceted policies in developing countries that go beyond “classical programmes” 
aimed at preventing outflows and encouraging the return and reintegration of emigrated 
specialized human capital (Tuirán, 2009). We will return to the policy debate later. These 
examples aim simply to illustrate the influence of the neoclassical economics of the brain 
drain and its aggregative approach.  
 
In contrast, as was discussed earlier, the bases for a different vision, which were laid out 
on the eve of the brain drain debate, have had little apparent influence. Boulding’s (1968) 
description of human capital as a “structure” that resists aggregation is admittedly a 
methodologically challenging conception. As Loasby (2008: 50) describes, 
 
[e]ach individual and each established connection between individuals may be 
regarded as a bearer of capital, but the effectiveness of each unit of capital depends 
on the structure in which it is embedded.  
Loasby stresses the fact that human capital is not reducible to isolated individuals, and 
that its value depends on the structure of differentiated complementary and context 
dependent elements in which it is mobilized. Here, it seems that the thinking that 
reflected Boulding’s earlier description of human capital has re-emerged in economics 
discourse after a prolonged hiatus.  
 
The lost fundamentals of complementarity and context have allowed economic thinking 
about the brain drain to be restricted to aggregative analyses, which we believe, are based 
on a simple conflation of HRST and human capital. If human capital is assumed to be 
embedded in individuals, without connecting its value or potential to the context in 
which it is mobilized, then calculating human capital can be simply equated to counting 
individuals. As we have outlined, this has been particularly important due to the 
influence of economic analyses in framing policy formation. However, these apparent 
limitations of the mainstream economics approach to the brain drain problematic have 
also opened space for literature that challenges fundamental neoclassical assumptions 
about human capital and emphasizes neglected social and connectionist elements. It is to 
this literature that we now turn.  
The (re-)connective dimension: Diaspora networks  
The conceptual limitations of the neoclassical economics of the brain drain have been 
challenged by Meyer and colleagues in their work on scientific diasporas (see Meyer, 
2001, 2003; Meyer and Brown, 1999; Meyer and Charum, 1995). The stated motivation 
for this work was the failure of policies based on the neoclassical approach – that is, 
retain, attract, return – to regulate flows of the highly skilled or reduce the negative 
impacts on developing countries (Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Brown, 1999).  
 
According to these authors, the policy problem follows from a theoretical failure to 
properly conceptualize human capital in general and, in particular, human capital devoted 
to scientific and technological activities. Meyer (2001: 95) argues that “brain drain 
approaches are semantically and historically associated” with “the human capital 
paradigm”, referring to the theoretical framework described in this paper as the 
neoclassical economics of the brain drain. This paradigm is characterized by a 
“substantialist view of skills as a stock of knowledge and/or abilities embedded in the 
individual” (Meyer, 2001: 95). Human capital is conceived as discrete and accumulated 
during specific periods of life (e.g. education), a conception that does not differentiate 
between human and physical capital (Meyer et al., 2001). The individual is conceived as 
a mere human capital asset (Meyer and Brown, 1999), technically independent from 
other economic agents and free to respond to market signals (Meyer, 2001).  
 
Meyer and Charum (1995) stress the unreality of a theoretical world characterized by 
fundamental homogeneity, instantaneity and isolation of economic agents. Meyer and 
colleagues draw on science and technology studies that demonstrate the collective and 
distributed nature of cognitive frameworks, communities of practice and technical skills 
in highly complex fields such as scientific research and engineering. According to Meyer, 
“these approaches … present individuals as being involved in knowledge-intensive 
activities, deeply rooted in their networks, with their own skills being historically and 
physically contextualised” (2001: 96). 
 
The basic conceptual shift proposed thus consists of considering the “relational 
dimension of skills, which is inherent to their development as well as to their 
application” (Meyer, 2001: 95). Individuals are considered to be embedded in time and 
space and interconnected in various ways. Hence, the value and effectiveness of human 
capital depend on the complementarity of the human capital assembled in collectives of 
skilled individuals, and how it relates to other resources, including infrastructure 
(physical capital) (Meyer and Brown, 1999) and institutions (Meyer and Wattiaux, 
2006). Human capital is therefore (re)defined as contextual and relational/connected. 
Meyer and colleagues refer to their own approach as being “connective”; we would argue 
that the underdeveloped significance of their thinking is that it points towards a theory of 
human capital understood as distributed rather than aggregated.  
 
The reader will detect strong similarities between this approach and the list of “key 
structuring elements” characterizing the early economic debate on the brain drain in the 
1960s. In fact, these authors are reintroducing fundamental ideas concerning the nature 
of human capital devoted to scientific activities that were already present in the early 
debate on the brain drain. Let us recall here that, for Boulding, Johnson or Kidd, the 
contextual, temporal, relational and complementary nature of human capital were the 
grounds on which they built their arguments regarding the brain drain. In this sense, we 
may talk of an interesting historical theoretical “loop” concerning the brain drain that has 
the particularity of being interdisciplinary.  
 
Meyer and colleagues developed their connectionist approach through empirical 
investigations, notably observations of “scientific diasporas” (Barré et al., 2003) or 
“diaspora knowledge networks” (DKNs) (Meyer et al., 2001) as a subset of the 
transnational organization of scientific work. DKNs organized around national or cultural 
identification, such as Red CALDAS (Columbia), were found to “contribute to the 
development of their members’ place of origin through their skill input” (Meyer and 
Wattiaux, 2006: 5). DKNs were observed to be a mechanism for ongoing benefits from 
national investments in highly skilled human capital, subsequently located offshore, to 
flow back to the “home” system in various ways. Subsequently, it was argued that the 
DKNs’ approach “subverts the traditional ‘brain drain’ migration outflow into a ‘brain 
gain’ skills circulation by converting the loss of human resources into a remote although 
accessible asset of expanded networks” (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 5).  
 
This alternative interpretation of mobility has influenced policy programmes in several 
countries, which have put the stress on the “re-linking”, instead of the return, of 
expatriate talents in the interests of capturing benefits from human capital 
(Didou-Aupetit, 2009). Since the 1990s, programmes to encourage the organization of 
scientific diasporas have proliferated, including RAICES in Argentina, Chileglobal in 
Chile, ANA in Nigeria and ATPER in Thailand.7 Despite the apparent proliferation of 
this type of network, a “diaspora effect” contributing to scientific and technical 
development in the countries of origin has been put into question (Gaillard and Gaillard, 
2003).  
 
From our perspective, there does appear to be a gap between, on the one hand, a critique 
of the theoretical discourse of standard human capital theory, which points out the 
relational dimension of skills and rejects the isolationist ontology of self-contained units 
of human capital bounded by individual human bodies and, on the other hand, empirical 
evidence of connections among individuals and networks of individuals (HRST). The use 
of “network” in DKN research does seem to fall back into an identification of 
connections between individuals as constitutive of spaces of communication and 
circulation. Meanwhile, the notion of human capital as distributed rather than allocated 
recedes from view. Unlike the conflation of human capital and HRST within the 
neoclassical economics of the brain drain, the DKN literature separates the two concepts, 
but then fails to conceive of theoretical implications in the ontological realm of human 
capital that might have been provoked by delineation of transnational networks of the 
highly skilled.  
 
This is not to suggest that the DKN literature does not make an important contribution. 
There are theoretical and pragmatic difficulties inscribed in trying to develop a dialogue 
between a conception of distributed human capital, characterized by complementarity 
and context dependence, and the problematic of “gains” and “drains” of HRST between 
different places – particularly mobility from the developing world to the developed. The 
key insight that we draw from the DKN literature in relation to the problematic of the 
brain drain is that the mobility of human resources, in all likelihood (although not 
necessarily), reconfigures distributions of human capital. That such reconfigurations may 
be productive or destructive in their effects is contingent and requires empirical 
investigation, interpretation and analyses within a theoretical framework that remains, as 
yet, undeveloped. 
 
The DKN literature has been influential nevertheless. Policymakers now seek an 
optimum combination of the “aggregative” and the “connectionist” in their policy mix 
(Villanueva, 2009). The EU put stress on the “train, retain, attract” policy approach only 
some years ago, but has recently incorporated the connectionist policy discourse by 
recognizing the value of European researchers working in the USA and the need to build 
links with them (CEC, 2005).8 Many of the newly industrialized countries in the Asian 
region have long recognized the value of “offshore” stocks of human capital (diasporas) 
(Saxenian, 2005; Song, 1997). Importantly, many policies in the Asian region now target 
short-term or temporary stays to enable “home” countries to leverage knowledge and 
learning from their offshore nationals. The freedom to continue to circulate 
professionally and maintain concurrent commitments overseas has also been a 
particularly crucial factor in encouraging the contribution of foreign-based scientists in 
the case of China (Zweig, 2007). The contemporary policy mix thus seeks to combine a 
competitive “war for talent” (Kapur and McHale, 2005) rationale with a collaborative 
connectionist approach designed to leverage human capital located offshore. An 
expansion in the theoretical framing of the brain drain and subsequent diversification of 
policy design can therefore be discerned.  
 
However, many of the limitations of contemporary approaches remain relatively 
unchanged since Boulding’s 1960s argument. The concepts of human capital and HRST 
are largely entangled and interchangeable in discourse. The configuring of human capital 
by its context, its location within the “matrix of information flows” and hence its 
potential for adaptation and evolution has been eclipsed by the accounting for stocks and 
flows of researchers and, more recently, identifying connections between them. The 
challenge for theory beyond the economics of the brain drain is thus precisely to be able 
to describe the complex dynamics of human capital mobilization and distribution, 
without being again seduced by the relatively straightforward visibility and calculability 
of units and aggregates of human resources.  
Towards a socio-economics of distributed human capital 
Our major undertaking in this paper was a review of contributions made by the early 
thinkers on the brain drain. We have pointed out that fundamental elements of the early 
debate, specifically the complementarity and context dependency of human capital, were 
subsequently lost. This allowed the economics of the brain drain to become enclosed for 
almost four decades within the legacy of mechanical thinking (Dopfer, 2005). The 
mechanistic paradigm, by assuming the independence of economic agents, treats the 
contribution of human capital – and therefore its economic value – as almost constant 
regardless of the context in which it is applied and of the other entities to which it relates. 
Only the concept of externalities allows a very limited consideration of its social effects. 
Accumulation of human capital is then the dynamic that matters.  
 
We pointed out the conflation of the category of HRST and the concept of human capital, 
enabling economic calculations in which individuals and human capital are effectively 
equivalent units. The subsequent emergence of technically sophisticated models and 
calculations that characterize mainstream economic analyses of the brain drain then 
demonstrates the utility of the approach. By measuring the dynamics of the allocation of 
human capital using the proxy of movements of persons across national frontiers, a 
calculable object is forged, entrenching the power and persuasiveness of a particular 
analytical paradigm. We would argue that the seductiveness of complex calculations in 
buttressing the mechanistic paradigm has much to do with the way in which the brain 
drain problematic has been framed and “managed” in recent decades. 
 
Such an approach could perhaps be justified if it was explicitly argued that human 
resources and human capital were interchangeable, and that no “extra-individual” 
attributions could be attached to human capital. However, quite the opposite is the case. 
Our review of the early debate in economics and of Meyer and colleagues’ arguments 
suggest an alternative formulation of the contribution of human capital to social and 
economic development, in which both the complementarity of heterogeneous human 
capital and the contexts of its use are emphasized. Human capital would be addressed 
from a systemic perspective that considers its interdependencies with other production 
factors and its changing and dynamic role in economic and social structures. Human 
capital should not be conceptualized as an aggregate (like HRST) but as distributed 
across heterogeneous structures embedded in time and space; variably context dependent 
and therefore not automatically transferable; and complementary to other assets that 
make it valuable. A theory built around these fundamentals would reframe the study of 
HRST mobility by focusing on the alteration of human capital structures it may induce, 
without assuming a priori any aggregative or loss effects.  
 
Understood this way, the exercise of calculating national allocations of highly skilled 
HRST is of only limited use in understanding the dynamics of mobilization of human 
capital for scientific research and socio-economic development; activities that are 
complex, collective and organized across and beyond national frontiers. Crucially, the 
utility of human capital for any potential beneficiary is not necessarily delimited by the 
geographical location of individuals, collectives or parts thereof. However, whilst it has 
been relatively straightforward to calculate national stocks and net flows of human 
resources as if they were the outcome of consistent market processes, it appears 
extremely challenging to map distributions of human capital mobilized for the production 
and/or use of knowledge, to understand how these structures are reconfigured by HRST 
mobility, and to calculate what impact these reconfigurations have from the perspectives 
of interested parties.  
 
The diaspora studies that we reviewed earlier foregrounded the distributed nature of 
productive collectives and the relational dimensions of skills and human capital. These 
are fundamentals that are important for renewed brain drain studies. However, the 
diaspora approach was also limited by its own reinscribing of homogeneity – of culture 
and/or national interest – within its networks. This is in contrast to wider diaspora 
scholarship, which is more likely to conceptualize diaspora “in terms of hybridity, 
métissage or heterogeneity” (Braziel and Mannur, 2003: 6). Thinking about distributed 
human capital in such terms refers us to spatially unbounded processes of creativity, 
emergence, (re-)combination and bricolage. Hybridity and heterogeneity – of objectives, 
interests, organization and people – replace simple dichotomies of home/abroad, 
national/international and loss/gain. Vectors of change forged by the dynamics of human 
capital, which mobilize knowledge, skill, learning and investment across particular 
material and institutional contexts, ultimately underpin emergent socio-economic 
innovation and development.  
Notes 
 
1 See, for example, the discussions and references in the “brain drain” section of 
the Science and Development Network website, at http://www.scidev.net  
2 Boulding made his early contributions to the brain drain debate in the 1960s, but 
it was not until the 1980s that he fully elaborated his evolutionary theory of economics. 
Evolutionary economics emerged in the decade of the 1980s as an alternative to the 
dominant neoclassical paradigm, particularly in relation to the study of the economic 
dynamics induced by innovation processes and technical change. For example, Dopfer 
(2005: 17) reviews the main empirical axioms of what he calls “an evolutionary 
ontology”. Among these axioms are: “the recognition of relations and connections”, that 
generate “associations” and therefore “structures”, and the recognition of “existences as 
process”; a process is conceived as “structure in time”.  
3 Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) point out that if finite instead of infinitesimal 
shifts of labour are considered, emigration will cause a loss to those left behind. 
However, depending of the size of the emigration and the nature of the production 
function, this loss may still be very small.  
4 Despite the acknowledgement of external effects, in the neoclassical tradition 
human capital units remain fundamentally unrelated. The connection among them is only 
partially captured through the concept of externalities. This concept simply reflects the 
idea that the market is not able to fully capture the value generated through social 
interactions, but does not permit us to address the nature of those interactions and of the 
social value created.  
5 According to Becker (1993 [1964]: 346), this explains why the brain drain of 
educated and skilled persons almost invariably occurs from poorer to richer countries.  
6 Grubel and Scott’s 1966 paper encouraged some critical reactions from 
scientists, published in a letters section on the “Brain Drain Dilemma” in Science, 
154(3752).  
7 See http://www.raices.mincyt.gov.ar, http://www.chileglobal.org, 
http://www.ananet.org and http://www.apter.org. For a thorough review of the DKNs 
operating at the end of the 1990s, see Barré et al. (2003).  
8 Global initiatives have also emerged, such as Transfer of Knowledge through 
Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN), from the United Nations Development Programme.  
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